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NEW GOVERNANCE AND INDUSTRY CULTURE
Karen Bradshaw Schulz*
New governance scholarship argues that a blend of public and private regulation is playing
an increasing role in influencing firm behavior. Despite its burgeoning growth, new governance
scholarship is critiqued as lacking practical examples. This Article begins to fill that void by
conducting a new institutional economics analysis of forest sustainability certifications, an
example of new governance. This Article analyzes the features of the domestic forest industry to
trace why new governance emerged within it and has persisted for over seventy years. The industrial characteristics that contribute to this longstanding new governance regime include strong
norms within the industry, a resource-type that favors user-developed rules, and robust competition among private actors to regulate the industry. These findings suggest that new governance
may emerge as a regulatory tool to address environmental problems in other industries that possess similar characteristics. The Article also sheds light into the broader discussion of how to
measure the “success” of new governance regimes. It identifies stakeholder involvement relative to
the democratic process and displacement of other regulatory tools as two key considerations in
evaluating new governance approaches.

INTRODUCTION
New governance—legal reform emphasizing the role of non-state actors
in influencing behavior against a backdrop of the state1—is an important
emerging intellectual movement.2 New governance scholars are “engaged in
developing a broad menu of legal reform strategies that involve private industry and nongovernmental actors in a variety of ways while maintaining the
necessary role of the state to aid weaker groups in order to promote overall
* Associate Professor of Law, Arizona State University, Sandra Day O’Connor College
of Law. I appreciate comments provided by Bruce Huber, Jonathan Masur, Souvik Saha,
Roger Sedjo, Jonathan Rose, Arden Rowell, Vanessa Casado Perez, and Ingrid VisserenHamakers. Thanks are also due to the workshop participants who commented on the
paper at: The ASU Sandra Day O’Conner College of Law, The University of Illinois School
of Law, the Society of Environmental Law and Economics, the Yale School of Forestry and
Environmental Sciences Government, Environment and Markets Seminar Series, the Yale
School of Forestry and Environmental Sciences Forest Forum, and the New York University
Department of Economics Market Institutions and Economic Processes Workshop. The
Bell Fellowship provided financial support to travel to research primary materials at the
Forest History Society at Duke University, where Cheryl Oaks and Steve Anderson provided
invaluable assistance.
1 See Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness and
Transformative Politics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 937, 983 (2007).
2 See Bradley C. Karkkainen, “New Governance” in Legal Thought and in the World: Some
Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471, 478 (2004).
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welfare and equity.”3 A central feature of new governance is extralegal regulation that privileges private actors in rule setting and rule enforcement,4
which marks a shift from the previous state centric or market mechanism
regulatory approaches.5
Although the term “new governance” appeared in the literature relatively recently,6 the underlying idea of private regulation against a backdrop
of state enforcement is not new. This Article traces that idea through a
review of literatures addressing corporate social responsibility;7 environmental nongovernmental organizations,8 and the study of norms in law and economics.9 Each of these literatures foreshadowed the emergence of new
governance by observing that industrial action can be regulated by private
regulatory schemes operating against the backdrop of state regulation.
Critiques of new governance scholarship center on the lack of detailed
empirical studies illustrating the principles in action. Leading articles are
critiqued as having a “high level of generality”10 and focusing on “ambiguous” and “scattered” policy assessments with innovations found “here and
there.”11 As a result, examples in the field appear “aberrational, idiosyncratic, or unproven, and the anecdotes and case studies heralding these
developments unconvincing . . . .”12 Adherents to new governance agree that
there is a pressing need for detailed studies examining the circumstances of
when non-state regulation succeeds.13
3 See Lobel, supra note 1, at 983.
4 Id.
5 See Guy Mundlak & Issi Rosen-Zvi, Signaling Virtue? A Comparison of Corporate Codes in
the Fields of Labor and Environment, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 603, 606–07 (2011).
6 The term “new governance” first appeared in a 1996 article. See R.A.W. Rhodes, The
New Governance: Governing Without Government, 44 POL. STUD. 652 (1996). In 2004, Orly
Lobel published the article that “sound[ed] a clear alarm” that the movement was growing
within legal literature. Karkkainen, supra note 2, at 478 (citing Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal:
The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L.
REV. 342, 345–47 (2004)).
7 See Part I.A.1; see also Ronen Shamir, The Age of Responsibilization: On Market-Embedded
Morality, 37 ECON. & SOC’Y 1, 7–8 (2008) (discussing the relationship between new governance and corporate social responsibility).
8 See Part I.A.2; see also Annecoos Wiersema, A Train Without Tracks: Rethinking the
Place of Law and Goals in Environmental and Natural Resources Law, 38 ENVTL. L. 1239,
1241–44 (2008) (discussing a critical body of environmental law literature suggesting that
traditional legal governance is outmoded and new forms of regulation involve “enhanced
involvement of private actors in the traditionally public sphere of bureaucracy and its
implementation”).
9 See Part I.A.3; see also Warren J. Samuels & Steven G. Medema, Ronald Coase on Economic Policy Analysis: Framework and Implications, in COASEAN ECONOMICS 161, 164 (Steven G.
Medema ed., 1998).
10 Karkkainen, supra note 2, at 478.
11 Id. at 476.
12 Id. at 477.
13 See Lobel, supra note 1, at 982 n.206.
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This Article joins in the task of providing examples of new governance14
to provide a detailed analysis of new governance operating within a particular
industrial setting. It conducts a new institutional economics15 analysis of the
industrial features that led to voluntary, market-based sustainability certifications for forests and forest products. Sustainability certifications are a voluntary, primarily private16 regulatory regime that incentivizes firms to conduct
their operations in accordance with what the certification identifies as
socially desirable standards.17 For reasons previously unexplored, the forest
industry contains an unusually longstanding example of sustainability
certifications.18
This Article presents a case study of sustainability certifications in the
forest industry. First, it describes the emergence and interplay between the
leading forest and wood product certifications.19 This Article provides a
novel account of the first forest sustainability certification, The American
Tree Farm System. A modern, comprehensive account of the history and
development of the American Tree Farm System does not exist in scholarly
literature across relevant disciplines—including law, natural resources, environmental sciences, corporate social responsibility, and forestry. Yet, the
American Tree Farm System plays a crucial role in understanding the later
proliferation of other sustainability certifications within the forest industry.
It also highlights that sustainability certifications emerged not as private self14 For recent efforts to provide examples of new governance, see generally, Lisa T.
Alexander, Stakeholder Participation in New Governance: Lessons from Chicago’s Public Housing
Reform Experiment, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 117 (2009) (examining how stakeholders take part in new governance); Julia Black, Paradoxes and Failures: ‘New Governance’ Techniques and the Financial Crisis, 75 MOD. L. REV. 1037 (2012) (examining the performance of
four new governance techniques); Eric Tucker, Old Lessons for New Governance: Safety or
Profit and the New Conventional Wisdom, Osgoode CLPE Research Paper No. 36/2012 (2012)
(examining new governance models in OHS regulation).
15 See David M. Driesen, Contract Law’s Inefficiency, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 301, 334
(2011); Steven G. Medema, Discourse and the Institutional Approach to Law and Economics:
Factors that Separate the Institutional Approach to Law and Economics from Alternative Approaches,
23 J. ECON. ISSUES 417 (1989) (exploring relationship between legal and economic
processes in several theories of law and economics).
16 The earliest sustainability certifications operated in conjunction with state forestry
agencies. See infra Part I.C.
17 See, e.g., COMM. ON CERTIFICATION OF SUSTAINABLE PRODS. & SERVS. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, CERTIFIABLY SUSTAINABLE? 3 (2010) (explaining the role of third-party certification systems). The question of social desirability in setting standards raises the question of “social
desirability to whom?” Certifiers may establish standards that are misaligned with the values that consumers purchasing a certified product would support. This creates an information problem because many consumers do not carefully study the details of the
standards underlying a certification.
18 See Errol E. Meidinger, “Private” Environmental Regulation, Human Rights, and Community, 7 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 123, 126 (2000) (reviewing the Forest Stewardship Council’s certification program).
19 Sustainable forest certifications have existed since the early 1940’s, with a flurry of
activity and competition arising in the 1990s. See Errol E. Meidinger, The New Environmental
Law: Forest Certification, 10 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 211, 214–16 (2003).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-5\NDL515.txt

2518

unknown

Seq: 4

notre dame law review

17-JUL-13

11:01

[vol. 88:5

regulation by an industry, but instead as a public-private partnership, in
which state agency employees and industry actors worked together to enforce
standards.20
Second, this Article identifies the industrial features that contribute to
the continuous, seventy-year existence of sustainability certifications within
the forest industry. Drawing upon legal, sociological, and economic literature about forest use,21 it argues that the emergence of certifications in the
forest industry are attributable to: (1) the existence of rich, well-developed
norms among a merchant group comprised of large, industrial land managers and state foresters; (2) a resource-type that is conducive to user generation and enforcement of rules; and (3) a robust competition for private
regulatory control over industry activity.
The findings provide a starting point for further research about both the
conditions under which new governance can operate in practice22 and the
broader discussion about when new governance is an appropriate means of
regulating the behavior of industrial actors. Although forest sustainability
certificates produced a significant “greening” of the industry,23 their success
both individually and collectively remains extremely controversial. This
underscores that there is no agreed-upon set of metrics to evaluate new governance regimes. Two themes for evaluation of new governance regimes
emerged from the forest sustainability certification case study: (1) the inclusiveness of diverse groups of stakeholders in new governance relative to democratic processes; and (2) the displacement of other, more stringent
legislation by new governance regimes.
Part I situates new governance literature amidst existing scholarship.
This Part argues that a new institutional economics analysis can address the
void of practical examples within new governance literature. Part II provides
a novel case study of the emergence of sustainability certifications within the
domestic forest industry. Part III identifies norms, rule development and
enforcement, and a robust market for regulation as the factors that contribute to the ongoing existence of sustainability certifications in the forest
industry. Part IV situates the findings from forest sustainability certifications
into the broader framework of understanding the industrial culture and con20 See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
21 Bruce Ackerman argues that lawyer-economists should “look to the sciences of culture . . . anthropology, sociology, and sociolinguistics” to address the perceived limitations
of neoclassical economics. Bruce A. Ackerman, Law, Economics, and the Problem of Legal
Culture, 6 DUKE L.J. 929, 941–42 (1986) (footnotes omitted). Similarly, George Priest suggested that “one must abandon the notion that law is a subject that can be usefully studied
by persons trained only in the law.” George L. Priest, Social Science Theory and Legal Education: The Law School as University, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 437, 437 (1983). Priest argued that “the
best writing about the legal system is interdisciplinary.” Id. at 440.
22 This Article highlights, but does not resolve, the problem of establishing metrics
with which to evaluate the “success” of new governamce. See infra note 86.
23 See Errol E. Meidinger, The New Environmental Law: Forest Certification, 10 BUFF.
ENVTL. L.J. 211, 214–15 (2003).

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-5\NDL515.txt

2013]

unknown

Seq: 5

17-JUL-13

new governance and industry culture

11:01

2519

ditions in which new governance strategies will emerge and whether they
should be considered successful.
I. NEW GOVERNANCE

AND

INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS

A central critique of new governance literature is the lack of practical,
real-world examples.24 Existing examples in the field have been critiqued as
idiosyncratic and unconvincing.25 Thus, a central, unexplored inquiry in
new governance literature is: What are the conditions—the underlying industrial culture—in which private regulation emerges?26 Detailed institutional
analysis is needed to further scholarly understanding. This Article provides a
detailed look into conditions underlying a longstanding private-public partnership to govern resource use, using a new institutional economics
approach. This Subpart outlines other literatures that anticipated new
governance.
A.

New Governance in Existing Literatures

Private forms of social regulation working in tandem with government
institutions are rapidly supplanting older, state-centric models of market regulation.27 New governance28 focuses upon non-state actors governing their
own behavior based on self-generated norms and rules,29 with decreased reliance state enforcement powers.30 New governance has been called a “third
way”31 between regulation and market mechanisms, in which a global public
24 See Karkkainen, supra note 2, at 476.
25 Id. at 477.
26 Lobel, supra note 1, at 982 n.206 (“[V]oluntary self-regulation . . . will work better in
certain situations, especially when a particular set of incentives exists. The culture of the
industry is significant . . . . More detailed research is required in order to understand these
differences and accordingly adopt adequate policies.”).
27 See Mundlak & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 5, at 606–07 (“The world of regulation has
undergone a major transformation over the last four decades, from the traditional statecentered ‘command and control’ regulation of the 1970s to market-based instruments (still
marshaled by the state) that characterized the turn of the century, and then to the various
types of new governance mechanisms that are in vogue today.”); see also Ronen Shamir,
Corporate Social Responsibility: Towards a New Market Embedded Morality?, 9 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 371, 372 (2008) (“As the analytical gaze shifts from state to non-state form of
authority, research tells of the relocation of regulatory functions from public to private
authorities” (internal citations omitted)).
28 See Lobel, supra note 6, at 343–44.
29 See Christine Parker, The Pluralization of Regulation, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 349
(2008) (examining the normative arguments for pluralism in regulation). New governance shares features with neoliberalism and has been associated with third way neoliberalism, existing between regulation and market solutions. See Joel Handler et al., A
Roundtable on New Legal Realism, Microanalysis of Institutions, and the New Governance: Exploring Convergences and Differences, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 479, 511.
30 See Shamir, supra note 27, at 372.
31 Handler et al., supra note 29, at 511.
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domain helps governments to produce effective action.32 In the international context,33 the rise of new governance is attributable to the failure of
traditional state governments to respond to the challenges of globalization
and related environmental problems.34
Although the uptick in new governance scholarship is recent, the idea of
private regulation of commercial exchange is well-established in several
strands of legal literature.35 Corporate law, environmental law, and law and
economics literatures point towards the importance of incorporating institutional analysis into the theoretical arguments of new governance.36 This Subpart argues that existing literatures inform the theoretical underpinnings of
new governance and provide a starting point for further inquiry of its operation in practice.
1.

The Corporate Law Literature: Corporate Social Responsibility

An example of new governance is when an industry creates rules to control the behavior of firms within it. A recent example of such private regulation is found in the corporate law literature on corporate social
responsibility. Corporate social responsibility describes industries and companies attempting to contribute to the resolution of societal problems
although they are not legally required to do so.37 The term “corporate social
32 See John Gerard Ruggie, Taking Embedded Liberalism Global: The Corporate Connection,
in TAMING GLOBALIZATION 93, 95–97 (David Held & Mathias Koenig-Archibugi eds., 2003)
(“[A] global public domain is emerging [in which the territorial state is not the cardinal
organizing principal], which cannot substitute for effective action by states but may help
produce it.”).
33 For a discussion of new governance from an international perspective, see Kenneth
W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG.
421, 421 (2000); Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives,
Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706, 708 (2010).
See generally LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE U.S. (Gráinne de Búrca &
Joanne Scott eds., 2006) (examining new governance from law and constitutionalism perspective, using case studies from Europe and the United States).
34 See THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE xv (Rodney
Bruce Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker eds., 2002); Ruggie, supra note 32, at 95–97.
35 Stefan J. Padfield, Finding State Action When Corporations Govern, 82 TEMP. L. REV.
703, 706 (2009) (“[H]istory suggests there is nothing new about the concept of corporations governing.”).
36 Because of its domestic focus, this Article does not focus upon the robust international law literature discussing new governance. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan
Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation Through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND J. TRANSNAT’L L. 501, 501 (2009) (describing the “new
kind of international regulatory system” on the rise).
37 See VIRGINIA HAUFLER, A PUBLIC ROLE FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR 31, 53, 81 (2001)
(discussing the growing number of corporations that are self-regulating on issues of environmental, labor, and information privacy).
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responsibility” was coined in the 1950s,38 but firms have long engaged in
voluntary over-compliance with socially-desirable objectives.39 Modern corporate law literature is replete with analysis and examples of corporate social
responsibility.40
Corporate social responsibility is premised on a belief that corporations
are well-situated to address social problems because of their financial
resources, human talent, and influence.41 Companies engage in socially
responsible activity for a variety of reasons, including: building their brand,
developing a corporate culture of giving, attracting consumers, and preventing regulation.42 Corporate social responsibility targets a plethora of social
issues, including labor relations, information privacy, and environmental
issues.43
A key dispute about corporate social responsibility is whether firms’
practices meaningfully increase social welfare or merely provide an illusion
that firms are good citizens.44 Todd Henderson and Anup Milani have
expressed skepticism towards the assumption that firms—rather than nonprofit entities or government agencies—are relatively better-positioned to
obtain socially desirable objectives.45 Supporters of corporate social responsibility suggest that industries are better-suited to promulgating rules and
monitoring their observance within the industry group, rather than through
external legal regulation.46 They also note that while corporate codes were
once considered public relations strategies, they have matured into genuine
38 Economist Howard Bowen coined the phrase ‘corporate social responsibility’ in a
book published in 1953. See HOWARD R. BOWEN, SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE BUSINESSMAN 8 (1953) (laying out the “social responsibilities of businessmen”).
39 See Marc Firestone, A Quick Look at Two Areas of Doctrinal Difference Between EU and
U.S. Decision Makers, 20 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 5–6 (2011) (noting that the “twenty-firstcentury boom in corporate social responsibility” is largely similar to antecedents from earlier eras); Padfield, supra note 35, at 706.
40 See, e.g., Shamir, supra note 7, at 7–8 (discussing the relationship between new governance ideas and a decline in state responsibility and increase in individual
responsibility).
41 See Aaron K. Chatterji & Barak D. Richman, Understanding the “Corporate” in Corporate
Social Responsibility, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 33, 33 (2008).
42 See id.
43 See HAUFLER, supra note 37, at 31, 53, 81.
44 See, e.g., CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FAILURES IN THE OIL INDUSTRY 8–11
(Charles Woolfson & Matthais Beck eds., 2005) (challenging the oil industry’s claims of
good corporate citizenship); Mundlak & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 5, at 658.
45 See generally M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and the Market for Altruism, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 571 (2009) (noting that for-profit corporations should
only compete in the market for philanthropy when they can do so more efficiently than
other market participants, namely non-profit organizations and government entities); see
also D. Gordon Smith, Response: The Dystopian Potential of Corporate Law, 57 EMORY L.J. 985,
1008 (2008) (critiquing reform proposals that shift power away from shareholders and
toward non-shareholder constituencies).
46 MATT RIDLEY, THE ORIGINS OF VIRTUE 202 (1996).
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civil constitutions.47 Such findings underscore the new governance tenant
that private regulation, operating against a backdrop of government regulation, should play a role in controlling firm and industry behavior.
2.

Environmental Law: Economic Tools for Preservation

A variety of regulatory approaches are used to address environmental
problems. Prior to the 1990s, environmental objectives were typically pursued using top-down command and control regulation.48 In the late 1980s,
some leading environmental law scholars argued that environmental protections were best achieved using private market forces rather than regulation.
In 1988, Bruce Ackerman and Richard Stewart argued that market mechanisms would save money and improve administrative efficiency.49 Such arguments led to the adoption of marketable permits,50 which were put into
practice in 1990 through the Clean Air Act sulfur dioxide emissions trading
program.51 The program was regarded as a success because it reduced costs
and incentivized technological innovation.52
Growing dissatisfaction with market-mechanisms is leading to increasing
contemplation of private regulation as a mechanism to address global environmental concerns. Global problems like climate change called into question the efficacy of market mechanisms.53 Scholars have begun to search for
complements to market mechanisms to solve environmental problems.54
Some suggest that new governance may provide new tools for addressing
troubling environmental issues.55

47 See Gunther Teubner, The Corporate Codes of Multinationals: Company Constitutions
Beyond Corporate Governance and Co-Determination, in CONFLICT OF LAWS AND LAWS OF CONFLICT IN EUROPE AND BEYOND 203, 203–04 (Rainer Nickel ed., 2010).
48 Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171, 172–78 (1988).
49 Id. at 171.
50 See Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons for Theory and
Practice, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 361, 364–65 (1989).
51 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o (2006).
52 Jeremy B. Hockenstein et al., Crafting the Next Generation of Market-Based Environmental Tools, 39 ENV’T 13, 15 (1997).
53 See Ruggie, supra note 32, at 115–16; THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 34, at 135; THINKING ECOLOGICALLY 105 (Marian R.
Chertow & Daniel C. Esty eds., 1997).
54 See, e.g., Steven Bernstein & Benjamin Cashore, Non-state Global Governance: Is Forest
Certification a Legitimate Alternative to a Global Forest Convention?, in HARD CHOICES, SOFT LAW
33, 34 (John J. Kirton & Michael J. Trebilcock eds., 2004).
55 See Wiersmema, supra note 8 at 1241–44.
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Norms Literature

Norms literature critiques legal centralism in which government is the
primary creator and enforcer of rules.56 Within close-knit groups, extralegal,
norm-based dispute resolution processes may be more efficient than formal
legal structures.57 Norms literature illustrates that industry actors define
their own rules,58 and that the success of transactions depend upon trust,
which reliance upon formal legal dispute resolution systems may
undermine.59
In 1991, Robert Ellickson published the canonical book Order without
Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes,60 which argued that norms—implicit rules
of behavior reflecting shared understanding of expression of communal values61—governed how parties resolved conflict.62 Ellickson’s case study of
cattle ranchers in rural Shasta County showed that conflict over problems
such as cattle trespasses were not resolved by reliance upon law and courts
but instead through use of norm-based resolution mechanisms.63
Ellickson’s work gave birth to a vast progeny of norm case studies,64 documenting norms in close-knit groups including tuna sellers,65 cotton
merchants,66 diamond merchants,67 and stand-up comedians.68 These case
56 See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 138 (1991) (advancing a theory that
seeks to predict the content of informal norms and show which norms fall beyond “the
shadow of the law”). Id. at 1.
57 See id. at 40–45 (showing that norms rather than law govern disputes among ranchers in Shasta County, California); see also Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton
Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724
(2001) [hereinafter Bernstein, Private Commercial Law] (discussing norms and non-legal
rule systems in the cotton industry); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal
Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 138–43 (1992) [hereinafter Bernstein, Opting Out] (exploring how the non-legal system of rules and norms governing the diamond industry developed and endured).
58 See RIDLEY, supra note 46, at 204.
59 See Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553, 570 (2001).
60 ELLICKSON, supra note 56, at 1.
61 See Elinor Ostrom & Xavier Basurto, Crafting Analytical Tools to Study Institutional
Change, 7 J. INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 317, 322 (2011) (defining norms as “prescriptions about
actions or outcomes that are not focused primarily on short-term material payoffs to
self. . . . [M]ost norms are acquired in the context of a community in which the individual
frequently interacts”).
62 ELLICKSON, supra note 56.
63 Id. at 40–45.
64 Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537,
548–49 (1998) (noting the prevalence of case-study norms scholarship was so great that it
formed a new school of legal thought termed “the New Chicago School”).
65 See Eric A. Feldman, The Tuna Court: Law and Norms in the World’s Premier Fish Market,
93 CAL. L. REV. 313, 313–14 (2006) (arguing that state law can “outperform informal group
norms by satisfying the business needs of close-knit merchants while simultaneously contributing to the shared values that underlie the success of their future transactions”).
66 See generally, Bernstein, Private Commercial Law, supra note 57 (examining the rules,
norms and institutions that make up the cotton industry).
67 See Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 57, at 138–43.
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studies used ethnographic research to demonstrate that close-knit groups
with shared values developed a set of norms that governed a shared understanding among that group of “social attitudes of approval and disapproval,
specifying what ought to be done and what ought not to be done.”69
B.

New Institutional Economics

This Article provides a new institutional economics analysis of the industrial features under which new governance emerges as a strategy to solve environmental problems. New institutional economics incorporates institutional
laws, rules, customs, and norms into economic analysis.70 Ronald Coase is a
leading proponent of studying the institutions in which economic transactions and regulatory regimes occurred.71 Coase provides the classic example
of going beyond “blackboard economics”72 to study the law as it is, and drawing lessons from real-world findings.73 Coase suggests that studying the process of exchange without specifying the institutional setting “makes little
sense”74 and “is as if one studied the circulation of the blood without having
a body.”75
Coase believes that institutional details are particularly relevant when
analyzing policy formation, providing a necessary complement to theoretical
analysis. He argues that policy formation must understand how various institutions—firms, markets, and regulations—work in practice.76 Legal scholars
have, at times, returned to Coase’s focus on institutional details to provide
68 See Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore): The Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV.
1787, 1787–88 (2008) (noting that despite a strong norm against stealing jokes, when a
joke is copied comedians do not sue for copyright infringement).
69 Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 914 (1996).
70 For an overview of new institutional economics and its interaction with legal
thought, see ERIK G. FURUBOTN & RUDOLF RICHTER, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC THEORY
(1998); HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (Claude Menard & Mary M. Shirley
eds., 2005). For a useful collection of papers on new institutional economics, see COASEAN
ECONOMICS, supra note 9.
71 A sampling of Coase’s institutional economics research includes the following: R. H.
Coase, How Should Economists Choose, in ESSAYS ON ECONOMICS AND ECONOMISTS 15 (1994);
R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); R. H. Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
72 Warren J. Samuels & Steven G. Medema, Ronald Coase on Economic Policy Analysis:
Framework and Implications, in COASEAN ECONOMICS, supra note 9, at 164 (discussing Coase’s
call for economists to move away from “blackboard economics” toward more realistic
assessments of policy outcomes (internal quotation marks omitted)).
73 Id. at 165.
74 Id. (quoting R. H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AM. ECON. REV.
713, 718 (1992)).
75 Ronald H. Coase, The New Institutional Economics, 140 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 229, 230 (1984).
76 See Ronald H. Coase, Discussion, in ECONOMICS OF FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 60, 61
(A.D. Scott ed., 1970).
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context and nuance to law and economic analysis.77 This has primarily
occurred within the norms literature, in which case studies providing excellent accounts of institutional detail abound.78 But, legal scholars have largely
left the work of identifying institutions and analyzing their inner workings to
social scientists.79
Recently, legal scholars have re-engaged with studying institutions using
a new institutional economics approach.80 The rise of “new institutional economics” has spilled over to law and economics, reenergizing the immersion
of legal scholars in institutional details. Legal scholars have recently taken a
new institutional economics approach to environmental law,81 labor law,82
speech institutions,83 and contract law.84
This Article provides a “gritty, detail-oriented”85 new institutional economics analysis of new governance. To drill down to the appropriate level of
industry detail, a great deal of narrowing must be done. This Article focuses
on sustainability certifications, a subset of corporate social responsibility,
which is a subset of private regulation. Within sustainability certifications,
77 See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994) (noting how Coase reveals an innovative perception
of institutional implications); Neil K. Komesar, In Search of a General Approach to Legal Analysis: A Comparative Institutional Alternative, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1350, 1351 n.1 (1981) (noting
that Coase has “continuously revealed a creative perception of the basic institutional implications in economic analysis”).
78 Among the proliferation of case studies are articles documenting norms in industries: Feldman, supra note 65 (discussing tuna salesmen); Bernstein, Private Commercial
Law, supra note 57 (discussing cotton merchants); Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 57
(discussing diamond merchants); Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 68 (discussing
comedians).
79 See Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821, 847
(2008) (integrating the lessons of institutional economics with Justice Holmes’s marketplace of ideas metaphor).
80 See David M. Driesen, Contract Law’s Inefficiency, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 301, 334 (2011)
(“An economic dynamic approach derived from institutional economics holds great promise for further improving our understanding of . . . law generally.”); Steven G. Medema,
Discourse and the Institutional Approach to Law and Economics: Factors that Separate the Institutional Approach to Law and Economics from Alternative Approaches, 23 J. ECON. ISSUES 417,
417–18 (1989) (“This article explore the rhetoric of the interrelations between legal and
economic procceses as expoundd in neoclassical law and economics, critical legal studies,
and neo-institutional law and economics.”).
81 Nicholas Mercuro & Michael D. Kaplowitz, Essay, Performance Indicators for Natural
Resource and Environmental Policy: Contributions from American Institutional Law and Economics,
11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 139 (2000) (applying an institutional law and economics
approach to developing performance indicators for natural resource and environmental
policy).
82 See Wenona T. Singel, The Institutional Economics of Tribal Labor Relations, 2008 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 487, 489–91 (2008) (applying new institutional economics to tribal labor laws).
83 See Blocher, supra note 79, at 822.
84 Driesen, supra note 80, at 302.
85 Blocher, supra note 79, at 847.
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this Article examines the forest industry, in which new governance practices
have operated for over seventy years.86
C.

Sustainability Certifications

Sustainability certifications communicate that participating firms are following a set of practices that supposedly enhance social welfare.87 The certifier—typically an industry group or NGO88—establishes a set of criteria
reflecting a goal that it believes will appeal to consumers, such as “dolphin
safe” or “fair trade.”89 The organizing body creates a logo that firms meeting
the criteria can place on their product, production facility, or website to market their products. The certifier often monitors firms to assure compliance
with certification criteria. Consumers express preferences towards certain
kinds of manufacturing processes or ingredients by purchasing certified
products, relying upon the certifiers’ assurance that products bearing that
86 There are numerous important questions about the metrics with which the “success” of sustainability certifications within forest industry, or any industry, should be measured. The “success” of certifications in forestry could potentially be described in terms of
the longevity of sustainability certifications within the industry, a consensus based upon
siviculture analysis that they produce better forest outcomes that laws alone, Meidinger’s
suggestion that they have “greened” the forest industry, or increasing formalization or
inclusion of standards. See BENJAMIN CASHORE ET AL., GOVERNING THROUGH MARKETS: FOREST CERTIFICATION AND THE EMERGENCE OF NON-STATE AUTHORITY 11 (2004) (exploring
“non-state market-driven” governance methods and systems in the forestry context); Meidinger, supra note 18, at 123. But, each of these criteria can and should be questioned. See
Tracey M. Roberts, Innovations in Governance: A Functional Typology of Private Governance
Institutions, 22 DUKE ENVT’L L. & POL’Y F. 67, 72 n.17 (2011) (“[D]espite an appearance of
‘representativeness,’ the composition of the institution is not an accurate signal as to
whether the institution is undertaking voluntary regulation that will have an overall beneficial effect on the greater community.”).
Questions must also be raised about the extent to which this private regulation has
displaced government regulation; the opportunity costs of resources allocated to sustainability certifications; and the costs of certification on stakeholders including small
timberland owners. There is considerable controversy concerning the relative merit of
various sustainability certifications within the forest industry, but this academic debate has
primarily occurred within schools of forestry and environmental science. Interdisciplinary
scholars, particularly those with legal, sociological, and business backgrounds, can provide
valuable perspectives to better define the metrics used to measure success in new
governance.
87 For a taxonomy of private regulation, see Roberts, supra note 86, at 77–78.
88 The guidelines or standards associated with sustainability certifications are developed and monitored by non-state actors. See COMM. ON CERTIFICATION OF SUSTAINABLE
PRODS. & SERVS., supra note 17.
89 Notably, firms can simply put these claims on their products without the certification process. Certifying lends legitimacy to these claims, however, as a third party assurance mechanism. See Margaret M. Blair et al., The New Role for Assurance Services in Global
Commerce, 33 J. CORP. L. 325, 343 (2008) (analyzing how the rapid development of third
party assurance systems in business is facilitating the spread of global norms for acceptable
business behavior).

R

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-5\NDL515.txt

2013]

unknown

Seq: 13

new governance and industry culture

17-JUL-13

11:01

2527

logo have been produced in accordance with the organizing bodies’
guidelines.
Firms’ motivation to participate in certification programs can include:
market pressure, seeking access to broader markets, capturing price premiums, desire to forestall regulation, or desire to undermine more rigorous
sustainability programs.90 Sustainability certifications are active in fishing,91
chemical companies,92 conflict-free diamonds, fair trade coffee, tea, cocoa,
and cotton.93 Certification programs are lauded as promoting transparency,
accountability, and public participation94 relative to traditional regulatory
regimes.95 They “encourage proactive industry, reduce transactions costs
and accelerate achievement of environmental targets due to less legal action
and conflict.”96 Certifications transmit business practices to other parts of
the world, particularly in environments where government regulation fails.97
To situate sustainability certifications in the literatures discussed
above,98 they are an example of new governance, in which private actors regulate firm behavior against a backdrop of limited state involvement or
enforcement but in parallel with existing governmental regulations on the
industry. Corporate law scholars view sustainability certifications as a tool in
the toolbox of corporate social responsibility, a form of third party assurances
to substantiate claims of responsibility and insure uniform adherence to
industry best practices.99 Environmental law scholars have heralded the rise
in sustainability certifications as the emergence of a post-market mechanism
regime in which the state is dethroned as the sole regulatory power and pri90 See James M. McElfish, Jr. et al., Inventing Nonpoint Controls: Methods, Metrics and
Results, 17 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 87, 200 (2006).
91 See MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, http://www.msc.org/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2012).
For a discussion of the Marine Stewardship Council, see Robert L. Glicksman, Sustainable
Federal Land Management: Protecting Ecological Integrity and Preserving Environmental Principal,
44 TULSA L. REV. 147, 198–99 (2008) (extending “the trust concept beyond these areas by
applying it to domestic federal public natural resources law in ways that current law does
not accomplish”); id. at 150.
92 See Neil Gunningham, Environment, Self-Regulation, and the Chemical Industry: Assessing
Responsible Care, 17 L. & POL’Y. 57–109 (1995) (examining self-regulation as a means for
environmental protection).
93 See Blair et al., supra note 89, at 343–44.
94 See COMM. ON CERTIFICATION OF SUSTAINABLE PRODS. & SERVS. supra note 17, at 10.
95 See Dinah A. Koehler, The Effectiveness of Voluntary Environmental Programs: A Policy at
a Crossroads?, in VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS 11, 21 (Peter deLeon & Jorge E.
Rivera eds., 2010); Mario Rizzo, Which Kind of Legal Order? Logical Coherence and Praxeological
Coherence, J. DES ECON. ET DES ETUDES HUMAINES 497, 498 (1999). For a comprehensive
comparison between sustainability certifications and government regulation, see COMM. ON
CERTIFICATION OF SUSTAINABLE PRODS. & SERVS, supra note 17, at 10–13.
96 Koehler, supra note 95, at 14.
97 Blair et al., supra note 89, at 330. This transmittal may, however, undermine local
and indigenous practices. Id.
98 See supra Part I.A.
99 See Blair et al., supra note 89, at 343–44.

R
R

R
R
R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-5\NDL515.txt

2528

unknown

Seq: 14

notre dame law review

17-JUL-13

11:01

[vol. 88:5

vate actors take a larger role in controlling firm behavior.100 Law and economics literature situates certifications as reflective of the idea that
“production can be accomplished either through a series of market transactions and contracts, or under the guidance and control of a hierarchical governance structure within a firm.”101 Norms scholars, who have yet to
comment directly on certifications, will likely view them as a new iteration of
extralegal regulation similar to previously observed forms of industry selfgovernance.
In sum, sustainability certifications are a blend of corporate social
responsibility, private regulation, and new governance. Forestry certifications are a longstanding example of a sustainability regime that has, arguably,
produced positive environmental and social outcomes.102 Despite this, little
research has been undertaken to analyze how forest sustainability certifications emerged and the conditions under which they have long played a role
in industry practices. What are the institutional characteristics underlying
the emergence of this form of private regulation in forest industry? This
inquiry provides much-needed information about the institutional features in
which proposals for new governance regimes to resolve environmental
problems can develop.
II. NEW GOVERNANCE

IN THE

FOREST INDUSTRY

This Part contains an original case study of the first forest sustainability
certificate, the American Tree Farm System, which started in 1940s. The case
study is constructed from primary materials archived at the Forest History
Society at Duke University. The analysis provides key, previously unexplored
information about the industrial characteristics that gave rise to voluntary
self-regulation within the forest industry. Then, it briefly describes the key
features of newer, competing certifications.
A.

An Overview of Forest Sustainability Certifications

There are three primary sustainability certifications for timberland and
timber products in the United States.103 In 1941, the American Tree Farm
100 See Errol Meidinger, The Administrative Law of Global Private-Public Regulation: The
Case of Forestry, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 47, 53 (2006) (describing the non-formal administrative
law certification programs for the global forest regulatory system).
101 Blair et al., supra note 89, at 326.
102 This is not to suggest that sustainability certifications are an unqualified success.
For a discussion of the difficulty in defining success in new governance approaches and the
considerations that I argue should be encompassed in such assessments, see Section IV.
103 Other certification regimes, including the Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification (a certification created in Europe), also operate in the United States. See
Caring for our Forests Globally, PEFC, www.pefc.org (last visited Mar. 7, 2013); Carolyn
Fischer et al., Forest Certification: Towards Common Standards? 1, 4 (May 2005) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
There are an assortment of failed certification systems that began but did not gain
traction within the forest industry and thus no longer exist, including the National Wood-
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System certification was created to identify landowners who provided good
stewardship of their land through responsible forest practices.104 In 1993, an
environmental nongovernmental organization spearheaded the Forest Stewardship Council certification, which verifies that wood is harvested using
legal logging practices from the forest of origin as lumber moves through the
supply chain.105 In 1994, the forest industry responded to the creation of the
FSC certification by starting a third forest sustainability certification: the Sustainable Forestry Initiative.106 Forest sustainability certifications have
received considerable scholarly attention.107 This Article does not reiterate
the important but already well-studied topics of providing comprehensive
overviews of certifications, 108 the multitude of forestry certification standards available at the state and national level,109 international certifications
with limited following in the United States,110 efforts made to control climate
change through forest policy,111 or a detailed methodology of how auditing
land Owners Association and Backyard Forest Certifications. See Box 25, Back Yard Tree
Farms, American Tree Farm System Records, Library and Archives, Forest History Society,
Durham, NC, USA.
104 Tree Farm Certification, AM. TREE FARM SYS., http://www.treefarmsystem.org/certification-american-tree-farm-system (last visited Mar. 7, 2013).
105 Our History, FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, https://us.fsc.org/our-history.180.htm
(last visited Mar. 3, 2013).
106 Basics of SFI, SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY INITIATIVE, http://www.sfiprogram.org/who-issfi/basics-of-sfi11/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2013).
107 A driving force of sustainability scholarship is Yale University’s School of Forestry
and Environmental Studies, which opened the “Yale Program on Certification,” to “maintain[ ] a strong focus on forest certification as one unique and potentially revolutionary
policy approach that harnesses the power of the marketplace to encourage compliance
with environmental and socially responsible standards.” YALE PROGRAM ON FOREST POLICY
AND GOVERNANCE, YALE, http://www.yale.edu/forestcertification/ (last visited Mar. 7,
2012).
108 For a comprehensive overview of various certification programs within the legal
literature, see Meidinger, supra note 18, at 126 (providing an overview of the Forest Stewardship Council, International Organization for Standardization’s ISO 14000, and the
American Forest and Paper Association’s Sustainable Forestry Initiative).
109 There are a multitude of forestry certification standards—Errol E. Meidinger, the
legal scholar who has written most about forest certifications, counted between six and
twenty certification programs in 2003, while another article stated that there were over fifty
forestry certification standards in 2009. Meidinger, supra note 19, at 216 (“Starting with
the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) in 1993, forest certification programs proliferated
rapidly.”); see also Stephen Del Percio, Revisiting Allied Tube and Noerr: The Antitrust Implications of Green Building Legislation & Case Law Considerations for Policymakers, 34 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 239, 242–51 (2009) (providing an overview of USBGC’s response to
the criticisms of the LEED system).
110 For a discussion of two international certifications, the Confederation of European
Paper Industries and Pan European Forest Certification (which have been adopted by both
European and non-European companies but are not widespread throughout the United
States), see Carolyn Fischer et al., Forest Certification: Towards Common Standards? 1, 4
(Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper 05-10, 2005).
111 See generally, Meinhard Doelle et. al., New Governance Arrangements at the Intersection of
Climate Change and Forest Policy: Institutional, Political and Regulatory Dimensions, 90 PUBLIC
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and monitoring is carried out.112 It does, however, provide a novel account
of the previously overlooked American Tree Farm System and outlines the
key features of the more recent certifications. This case study lays the foundation for analyzing the industrial culture in which new governance emerged
as a mechanism for obtaining environmental goals. This case study both contributes to the discussion of the conditions under which new governance is
likely to emerge and the more controversial topic of how new governance
efforts should be evaluated.
B.

The American Tree Farm System

Virtually all scholars who have studied forestry certification programs
attribute the beginning of forestry certification programs to the establishment of FSC in the early 1990s. But, in fact, the American Tree Farm System
(“ATFS”) began identifying some forests as sustainably managed fifty years
prior to the advent of the FSC. Unlike other forest certifications, the ATFS is
tied to the timberland rather than the timber products produced from it.
Because there is little substantive information about the American Tree
Farm System in legal scholarship,113 this section presents a somewhat
ADMIN. 37, 37 (2012) (using four case studies to investigate the “intersection between forest management and climate policy”).
112 Andrew Long, Auditing for Sustainable Forest Management: The Role of Science, 31
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 44 (2006) (stating that FSC provides the best guarantee that an
operation is sustainable by employing a consistent and highly detailed definition of
“sustainable”).
113 Westlaw reveals eight results for “American Tree Farm System.” None of these
results yields substantive information about the organization, its history, or development.
See Del Percio, supra note 109, at 242 (discussing the battle between LEED and other rating systems which gives rise to potential antitrust implications to adopting the LEED rating
system); Jody M. Endres, Agriculture at a Crossroads: Energy Biomass Standards and a New Sustainability Paradigm?, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 503, 507 n.15 (noting that the U.S. Scientific
Certification Systems do not have a comprehensive sustainability regime for biomass cropping); Blake Hudson, Promoting and Establishing the Recovery of Endangered Species on Private
Lands: A Case Study of the Gopher Tortoise, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 163, 208 (discussing
the “Forested Flyways Gopher Tortoise Initiative” implemented by landowners from the
American Tree Farm System in conjunction with conservation groups and government
agencies); Jeffrey W. King, An Overview of Green Construction Rating Programs, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN GREEN CONSTRUCTION LAW 85 (2011) (listing the American Tree Farm System
as one of several wood certification systems); McElfish et al., supra note 90, at 119 (discussing interviews with industry insiders about certification programs and listing the American
Tree Farm System as one of the three certifications followed in Tennessee); Meidinger,
supra note 19, at 216 n.8 (listing the forest certification programs included in a report
from the Confederation of European Paper Industries); William C. Siegel & Wade Ballou,
Jr., The “Primarily for Sale” Provisions of Sections 1221 and 1231 of the Internal Revenue Code as
Related to Timber Transactions, 39 ARK. L. REV. 73, 92 (1985) (listing as the facts of a tax case
that the plaintiff was a member of the American Tree Farm System); J. Jared Snyder,
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Model Rule, in GLOBAL WARMING 647 (ALI-ABA, 2008) (discussing the battle between LEED and other rating systems which gives rise to potential
antitrust implication to adopting the LEED rating system).
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extended history about the organization, which is vital to understanding why
new governance emerged within the industry. This case study is constructed
from primary materials archived at the Forest History Society at Duke
University.
1.

Inception and History of the American Tree Farm System

Domestic timber harvest practices underwent a large shift in the first half
of the twentieth century: firms shifted from viewing the forest as a singleextraction “timber mine” to a sustained yield “tree farm.” Weyerhaeuser
Timber Company was an early adopter of the forest-as-a-tree-farm philosophy. On June 12, 1941, the company devoted a 120,000 acre timberland near
Elma, Washington as a “Tree Farm,” a renewable resource, forest management program.114 The positive publicity generated by the Weyerhaeuser
Tree Farm prompted West Coast members to recommend that the National
Lumber Manufacturers Association sponsor a national Tree Farm program.115 In early 1941, the National Lumber Manufacturers Association
resolved to establish a national tree farm system116 called the “American Tree
Farm System” (ATFS).117
“Tree Farm” was defined as “an area dedicated to the growing of forest
crops for commercial purposes, protected and managed for continuous production.”118 Private landowners were granted the right to use the name
“Tree Farm” if they met four standards, including: (1) using land for the
production of forest crops, (2) providing reasonable protection from fire,
insects and disease, and from damage by excessive grazing, (3) harvesting
crops in a manner to assure future crops, and (4) furnishing information as
requested regarding the progress of the Tree Farm.119
In exchange for meeting these standards, the organization provided
timberland owners an insignia that signified that the land was maintained
114 American Tree Farm System History, THE FOREST HISTORY SOCIETY, http://foresthistory.
org/ATFS/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2013) [hereinafter FOREST HISTORY SOCIETY].
115 James C. McClellan, Analysis of the American Tree Farm System, at 1. Report for the
American Forest Products Industries, Inc. Box 1, TF History General 1 Folder, American
Tree Farm System Records, Library and Archives, Forest History Society, Durham, NC,
USA.
116 Richard Lewis, Tree Farming: A Voluntary Conservation Program, 25 J. FOREST HIST. 166,
168 (1981).
117 Id. at 166.
118 What is a Tree Farm? Box 1, Folder 1, American Tree Farm System Records, Library
and Archives, Forest History Society, Durham, NC, USA (“[T]he production and management . . . assures a continuous growing forest and repeated forest crops.”); Why Tree Farms,
Box 1, Folder 1, American Tree Farm System Records, Library and Archives, Forest History
Society, Durham, NC, USA.
119 Joint Committee on Forest Conservation, West Coast Tree Farms: The Next Step in
Timber Growing in the Douglas Fir Region, 3 (1943). Some state organizations of Tree
Farm Systems maintained individual standards of forest practices in addition to these universal standards. What is a Tree Farm? Box 1, Folder 1, American Tree Farm System
Records, Library and Archives, Forest History Society, Durham, NC, USA.
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according to the ATFS standards.120 Participants posted the tree farm insignia signs on their property and used it in their letterheads and advertising.121
Tree Farms were sponsored regionally in the West and by state in the East
and Midwest.122 In eastern and central states, state forestry departments
administered the program—including promoting, inspecting, and approving
the certification and dedication of Tree Farms.123 In the West, Forest Practice Committees comprised of industrial foresters administered the
programs.
From its inception in 1941, growth of the ATFS was rapid.124 Tree
Farms comprised 120,000 acres of timberland in 1941, 5 million acres in
1942, 7.5 million acres in 1943, and 17 million acres in 1949.125 The certification standards were very low initially, with many certifications granted in
recognition of established management.126 Four hundred landowners in
Alabama and Arkansas were largely certified without on-the-ground inspection of their property.127 A “publicity man,” rather than a forester, conducted the program in those states.128 The certification came under
scrutiny,129 criticized of being used to “cover up for a lack of sound conservation practices.”130 Further, there was a misperception among the public that
the ATFS was a tax dodge exempting landowners from taxes.131
120 See Memo Dated March 31, 1945 Box 1, Folder 1, American Tree Farm System
Records, Library and Archives, Forest History Society, Durham, NC, USA.
121 See American Tree Farm Systems, Box 1, Folder 1, American Tree Farm System
Records, Library and Archives, Forest History Society, Durham, NC, USA.
122 McClellan, supra note 115, at 8.
123 See id. at 8–9; see also Donald W. Smith, New Life for America’s Tree Farms, Southern
Forest Institute Inc. NEWS (undated) Box 3, TF Historical 2, American Tree Farm System
Records, Library and Archives, Forest History Society, Durham, NC, USA (“ATFS won
enthusiastic support from . . . many state forestry agencies. State forestry personnel in all
but a few states quickly became active inspectors.”).
United States Forest Service foresters (federal employees) were prohibited from participating in the Tree Farm program except on their own time, until 1988. Don Smith,
U.S. Forest Service Involvement in the Tree Farm Program, Memorandum to Southern Tree Farm
Chairman (October 6, 1988) Box 3, TF Historical 2, American Tree Farm System Records,
Library and Archives, Forest History Society, Durham, NC, USA.
124 See id.
125 See Paul F. Sharp, The Tree Farm Movement: Its Origin and Development, 23 AG. HIST. 41,
41 (1949).
126 See id. at 42.
127 McClellan, supra note 115, at 6.
128 See id.
129 See id. at 7; see also Editorial, What’s In a Name, 40 J. FORESTRY 595, 596 (1942) (noting that the singular focus on the growing of wood for commercial purposes
“[d]isregarded many other products and services that forestry produces, such as forage,
wildlife, recreation, amelioration of climate,” etc.).
130 IWA-CIO Resolution adopted at its internal convention. Woodworker, 10/8/52,
Box 1, TF History General #2, American Tree Farm System Records, Library and Archives,
Forest History Society, Durham, NC, USA.
131 See McClellan, supra note 115, at 2.
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By 1946, about half of the states participated in the ATFS, each with
regional organization and certification criteria.132 In 1946, the National
Lumber Manufacturers Association delegated responsibility for the ATFS to
the subsidiary American Forest Products Industries. In 1954, the central
organization polled industry stakeholders on a variety of topics in an effort to
improve the reputation of the program.133 Stakeholder input ultimately led
to the November 5, 1954 adoption of the “Principles of the American Tree
Farm System,” which specified the definition, sponsorship, purpose, requirements, and inspection of Tree Farms.134
Despite early growth, the ATFS was at risk of collapse by the late 1960s
due to insufficient funding and inattentive leadership.135 Industrial foresters
did not believe that the Tree Farms produced public relations benefits and
viewed tree farm inspections as unpaid work.136 Only ten states had functioning Tree Farm organizations.137
In 1968, the American Forest Institute, the successor to American Forest
Product Industry, assumed responsibility for the ATFS.138 It began a large
campaign to rejuvenate the ATFS,139 including re-inspecting tree farms,
excluding under-performing timber operations, and bolstering state tree
farm organizations.140 The success of the certification continued to wax and
wane from the 1970s to 1990s.141
Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, the ATFS instituted a number of
measures to increase the credibility of its certification.142 Key among the
changes at the ATFS was independent, third-party certification of landowner
compliance with certification standards. Today, credible sources, like the
132 See id.
133 See id. at 3.
134 American Farm System Timeline, THE FOREST HISTORY SOCIETY, http://foresthistory.
org/ATFS/timeline.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2013).
135 See FOREST HISTORY SOCIETY, supra note 114.
136 See McClellan, supra note 115, at 20.
137 Lewis, supra note 116, at 169.
138 Smith, supra note 123, at 4.
139 See id.
140 See Lewis, supra note 116, at 169.
141 Compare Lewis, supra note 116, at 169 (“By the mid-1970s, the integrity of the
national system had been reestablished, and the program was once again growing.”), and
FOREST HISTORY SOCIETY, supra note 114 (“After many years of struggle and retrenchment,
in the 1990s the American Tree Farm System emerged as a truly national program with
universally accepted national codes and standards.”).
142 For example, in 1991, the American Forest Council hired a consulting firm to assess
internal and external perceptions of the American Tree Farm System. See, e.g., A Survey on
the Image of Tree Farms and Tree Farmers (As perceived by American Adults) (January 1991); A
Survey on Tree Farming and the Tree Farm Program (As Perceived by Certified Tree Farmers) (January 1991) Tree Farm Review, Box 3, American Tree Farm System Records, Library and
Archives, Forest History Society, Durham, NC, USA.
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accounting firm Price Waterhouse Coopers, conduct risk assessments necessary to evaluate whether landowners are meeting certification standards.143
2.

Factors Animating the Creation of the American Tree Farm System

It is useful to contextualize the emergence of the ATFS against the backdrop of the conservation movement and timber industry at the time of the
inception of the program. Members of the forest industry created the ATFS
to address perceived problems of dwindling supply, threatened government
regulation, risk created by wildfire, and negative public perception.144 Each
of these factors is discussed below.
First, the forest industry was struggling to adapt to declining virgin timber stands.145 Prior to the late 1920s, commercial logging operations were
typically conducted as final-period transactions in which landowners would
purchase property, clear cut it, and then sell or abandon it.146 Forest
resources were approached as a “timber mine” from which the resource was
extracted a single time.147 Conservationists anticipated that the decline of
virgin (previously-uncut) tree stands would force the timber industry to
adopt conservative forestry techniques.148 In 1927, David Mason introduced
the idea of “sustained yield” forestry, advocating for limiting the number of
143 Brigitte Johnson, Nearly 783,000 Acres of Newly Certified Forestland Give Boost to Alabama’s Paper Industry, AMERICAN TREE FARM SYSTEM (Sept. 20, 2011), http://www.treefarmsystem.org/alabama-acres (noting that Price Waterhouse Cooper conducted a risk
assessment confirming that privately owned Alabama forestlands complied with the American Tree Farm System certification standards).
144 Other, less well-documented, motivations may have also prompted industry actors to
create the ATFS. For example, shortly after the enactment of the Tree Farm Program,
Congress enacted legislation to tax profits gained from timber harvest as capital gains,
rather than income, producing a lower tax rate. Wilson Compton, Why Tree Farms? Taxation and Tree Farms, in J.C. McClellan TF History, Box 1, Folder 1, American Tree Farm
System Records, Library and Archives, Forest History Society, Durham, NC, USA.
Further, in 1941, the National Lumber Manufacturers Association entered into a
National Lumber Decree (a consent decree) enjoined the organization from restricting or
increasing the quantity of timber produced except in furtherance of sustained forest managements in accord with principles of forest management—a program that ATFS likely
satisfied. See National Lumber Decree, (May 6, 1941) J.C. McClellan TF History, Box 1,
Folder 1, American Tree Farm System Records, Library and Archives, Forest History Society, Durham, NC, USA. Several scholars commenting on this Article, including Jonathan
Rose, have suggested that the antitrust implications of sustainability certifications across
industries is a topic worthy of future study.
145 For a discussion of this problem, see Samuel T. Dana, Industry Discovers Forestry,
MICH. ALUMNI Q. REV. 331, 332 (Summer 1952).
146 FOREST HISTORY SOCIETY, supra note 114 (“For decades, high tax rates on forestland
gave timberland owners little incentive to hold on to the lands and reforest them after
logging. Rather, it was cheaper to buy timberlands, log them, and then walk away and
default on the taxes.”).
147 Lewis, supra note 116, at 166.
148 See Sharp, supra note 125, at 42 (citing Walker B. Tilley, American Tree Farms, 42 J.
FORESTRY 796, 797 (1944)).
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cut trees each year to ensure the contined capacity of the forest to provide
wood product.149 In 1929, author Stewart H. Holbrook challenged this single-use of timberlands and coined the term “timber farming” to reflect a concept of timberland being cut and re-harvested.150 Conservationist Gifford
Pinchot supported the view that forestry should operate as tree farming.151
Second, and in a related point, members of the timber industry sought to
avoid government regulation or public ownership of timberlands.152 In
1941, the United States Forest Service announced that there were two alternatives for managing forests: either public ownership of timberland or
national regulation of forestry practices.153 Industrial timberland owners
objected to national regulation154 and instead proposed self-regulation155 or
state regulation156 of forest practices. Forest Service Chief Lyle F. Watts criticized the creation of the ATFS as an attempt by industry to avoid federal
regulation of private timberlands.157 One publication described the success
of the industry in offsetting the push for public forests and national regulation as “[winning a] major policy battle with the United States Forest Service
by the use of public relations.”158
Third, wildfire threatened the viability of commercial sustained-yield forestry,159 particularly because timberlands were self-insured.160 Tree Farms
were viewed as an opportunity to educate the public about the importance of
149 David T. Mason, Putting the Brakes on Timber Production, (1927) Manuscript Collection, File: Mason, David T., American Tree Farm System Records, Library and Archives,
Forest History Society, Durham, NC, USA.
150 Id. There is some argument about when the term was coined, with one author
attributing it to a 1917 speech by M.L. Alexander, commissioner of the Louisiana Department of Conservation. See Virgil W. Cothren, A New Look at the American Tree Farm System,
Speech presented at 1973 Meeting of the Southern Forest Institute, Atlanta, Georgia (Feb.
20–21, 1973), “TF Historical 2,” Box 3, American Tree Farm System Records, Library and
Archives, Forest History Society, Durham, NC, USA.
151 GIFFORD PINCHOT, BREAKING NEW GROUND 31–32 (1947).
152 See Sharp, supra note 125, at 43.
153 Id. at 43 (citing U.S. FOREST SERVICE, REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF THE FOREST SERVICE
13 (1941)).
154 For a discussion of the legal challenges industry posed to federal regulation of forestry, see Louis Hamill, Public Relations Programs and Forest Land Use, 53 GEOGRAPHICAL REV.
459, 460 (1963). See also Dana, supra note 145, at 337 (discussing regulatory challenges).
155 See Sharpe, supra note 125, at 43.
156 For a discussion of support of state legislation by the forest industry to avoid the
“danger of ‘regimentation from outside the state[,]’” see Editorial, supra note 129, at 595.
157 American Tree Farm Systems, Box 1, Folder 1, American Tree Farm System Records,
Library and Archives, Forest History Society, Durham, NC, USA.
158 Hamill, supra note 154, at 459.
159 See generally Karen M. Bradshaw, An Overview of Modern Wildfire Law, 21 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L. REV. 445 (2010) (explaining that the threat of wildfire diminishes the viability of
ongoing timber operations).
160 See Karen M. Bradshaw, Norms of Fire Suppression Among Public and Private Landowners,
in WILDFIRE POLICY 89, 94–95 (Karen M. Bradshaw & Dean Lueck eds., 2012).
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fire prevention.161 In conjunction with the advent of the ATFS, Weyerhaeuser invested in an infrastructure of lookout towers, telephone lines, and roads
to enable firefighting efforts.162 The Tree Farm movement was applauded as
“accomplishing a feat of indoctrination unparalleled in conservation history”
by arousing public interest in the danger of wildfire where the Forest Service
and conservation efforts had failed.163
Fourth, the industry sought to respond to the changing public perception of forestry.164 Managers sought to portray themselves as conservators,
rather than devastators, of forest resources.165 The ATFS adopted what were,
at the time, considered best practices, beyond what was legally required and
yet still fueled by a profit motive.166 Participation with the ATFS was not,
however, philanthropic preservation of swaths of timberland167, but instead a
mechanism to secure ongoing commercial production.168
Over time, the public relations component of the ATFS became increasingly important. A 1967 report noted that the ATFS was “the first, last and
best hope the industry has of demonstrating to small landowners, govern161 See Jamie Lewis, American Tree Farm System Turns 70, PEELING BACK THE BARK BLOG
(June 12, 2011), http://fhsarchives.wordpress.com/2011/06/12/american-tree-farm-system-turns-70.
162 See American Tree Farm System History, supra note 146.
163 Sharp, supra note 125, at 44.
164 The Tree Farm movement is considered “an inspired public relations program” for
supporting self-regulation of forestry activities by emphasizing private conservation efforts.
Lewis, supra note 147, at 168. Little is known about the strategy to change public perception of forestry, although appeals to the public about the conservation efforts of the American Tree Farm System extend from the very public initial dedication of tree farms to later
television advertisements featuring celebrities including Andy Griffith and Jimmy Carter.
See Inventory of the American Tree Farm System Records, 1924–2007, FOREST HISTORY SOCIETY,
http://www.foresthistory.org/ead/American_Tree_Farm_System.html (last visited Mar. 7,
2013).
165 See Dana, supra note 145, at 333 (“Corporations may be soulless, but the individuals
who run them are not. . . . [T]hey prefer public recognition as conservators, rather than as
devastators, of a basic resource.”).
166 At the public dedication of this Clemons tree farm, Governor Arthur B. Langlie
said, “This isn’t a charity, but a business venture. If it succeeds, it will set the pace for
millions and millions of acres of timberland.” Shaun Trujillo, New Collection: American Tree
Farm System Records, PEELING BACK THE BARK BLOG (June 22, 2010), http://fhsarchives.
wordpress.com/2010/06/22/new-collection-american-tree-farm-system-records (embedding a video of a Weyerhaeuser Company public service announcement developed in celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the Clemons Tree Farm).
167 See Dana, supra note 145, at 335 (“The Crown Zellerbach Corporation states frankly:
‘There is nothing philanthropic about these tree farms.’”).
168 How to Start a State Tree Farm Program, Box 1, Folder 1, American Tree Farm System
Records, Library and Archives, Forest History Society, Durham, NC, USA (“No [one]
should start a Tree Farm without first determining that it will be a profitable venture.
Tree Farms are for the commercial production of forest products and are not to be confused with efforts to grow trees for esthetic purposes.”).
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ment officials, politicians and people in general that it cares.”169 In 1983, an
employee of the Weyerhaeuser Company recommended that the ATFS be
developed into a marketing agency.170 In 1991, the ATFS commissioned a
report about public perception of its program.171
The emergence of the American Tree Farm System marks the advent of
a sustainability certification within the timber industry. Fifty years after the
creation of this certification, two new certifications emerged, developed by
the Forest Stewardship Council and the Sustainable Forest Initiative. Below
is a brief summary of these certifications, details of which are well-documented in environmental law.
C.
1.

Subsequent Sustainability Certifications

Forest Stewardship Council

In the 1980s, “environmental [nongovernment organizations] raised
public concerns about rapid deforestation, . . . [including] clear-cutting practices in North America.”172 Government regulation was failing to address
deforestation.173 In 1993, a coalition of non-governmental organizations
lead by the World Wide Fund for Nature started the nonprofit Forest Stewardship Council, a certification regime.174
FSC accredits third-party auditors to certify forestry firms who comply
with sustainable forest management practices.175 The sustainability standards and governance of the organization are controlled by nongovernmental organizations with ties to environmental, social justice, and industry
representatives.176 Voting membership is comprised of an economic chamber representing commercial interests, a social chamber for socially beneficial forest management interests, and an environmental chamber for
environmentally friendly forest stewardship.177 FSC is an umbrella organization that sets certification standards for independent certifiers, who determine that harvesters meet compliance standards prior to marketing their
wood as FSC certified.178
169 Archie Crafo, What If We Didn’t Have a Tree Farm Program, Address to Southern
Forest Institute—Area III (May 13, 1971) (citing Lincoln Research Center Report, Challenge of the Seventies (1967)).
170 Letter from T.J. Ebner, Weyerhauser Co., to Don Smith, Chief Forester, SFI (January 24, 1983) Box 3, TF Historical 2 Folder, American Tree Farm System Records, Library
and Archives, Forest History Society, Durham, NC, USA.
171 See supra note 142.
172 Fischer et al., supra note 110, at 1.
173 See generally BENJAMIN CASHORE ET AL., CONFRONTING SUSTAINABILITY (2006), available
at http://environment.research.yale.edu/documents/downloads/o-u/report_8.pdf (providing an overview of forest certification in the developing world).
174 See id. at 8.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Fischer et al., supra note 110, at 3.
178 Id.
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FSC describes its standards as “the highest social and environmental
requirements in the forestry sector,”179 an assessment with which leading academics180 and environmentally conscious companies seemingly agree.181
Williams Sonoma catalogues bear the FSC logo,182 and Wal-Mart183 and
Lowe’s prefer FSC over other certification standards.184 Empirical studies
show that FSC produces quantifiable, positive impacts on forests.185 “FSC’s
key alliances are with environmental [nongovernmental organizations] and
buyers groups, as well as [its] certified producers and sellers.”186 Despite its
popularity with environmental groups and commentators, FSC initially
experienced somewhat limited success with large industrial actors187 and was,
at first, primarily adopted by smaller timberland owners.188
2.

Sustainable Forestry Initiative Certification

Forestry landowners were skeptical and hostile towards the founding of
the FSC because it was created by nongovernmental organizations rather
than members of industry.189 But, forest industry insiders recognized the
value of sustainability certifications as a mechanism to improve their public
179 Glicksman, supra note 173, at 199 (internal quotation marks omitted).
180 See, e.g., Andrew Long, Auditing for Sustainable Forest Management: The Role of Science,
31 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 44 (2006) (“For the consumer seeking to purchase forest products from a well-managed source, FSC certification provides the greatest guarantee that an
operation’s management is sustainable.”); Meidinger, supra note 19, at 222 (“At present,
the FSC operates the most demanding certification program . . . .”).
181 Williams-Sonoma differentiates between FSC and SFI certification, noting that “FSC
is the gold standard when it comes to forest products certification systems.” Volume 2: Williams-Sonoma—NewPage Case Study the Ecology of Sustainability, AWARENESS INTO ACTION: THE
SUSTAINABLE ENTERPRISE, http://www.awarenessintoaction.com/casestudies/NewPage-Williams-Sonoma-fsc-sfi-certification-pefc.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2013) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Williams-Sonoma pressed its supplier for catalogue materials to work with
companies that obtained FSC certification, not SFI certification. See id.
182 See id.
183 See WALMART, SUPPLIER SUSTAINABILITY ASSESSMENT 20, 28, (2009), available at http:/
/www.bpaww.com/Bpaww_com/HTML/iCompli/Downloads/2012/CSR/Walmart_Sustainability_Assessment.pdf.
184 Fischer et al., supra note 110, at 8.
185 See Deanna Newsom et al., Does Forest Certification Matter? An Analysis of OperationLevel Changes Required During the SmartWood Certification Process in the United States, 9 FOREST
POL’Y & ECON. 197, 206 (2006) (“Our empirical analysis of FSC-certified operations provides practical evidence that forest certification does have quantifiable on-the-ground
impacts, assuming all conditions are implemented.”).
186 Meidinger, supra note 18, at 220–21 (footnote omitted).
187 See Benjamin Cashore et al., The United States’ Race to Certify Sustainable Forestry: NonState Environmental Governance and the Competition for Policy-Making Authority, 5 BUS. & POL.
219, 220 (2003).
188 See Jeffrey Hayward & Ilan Vertinsky, High Expectations, Unexpected Benefits What Managers and Owners Think of Certification, J. FORESTRY, Feb. 1999, at 13, 16.
189 See Meidinger, supra note 100, at 54 (2006). Interestingly, American, European,
and Canadian forest industries each developed an industry-sponsored certification standard to compete with the externally created FSC standard. See Fischer et al., supra note
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image without competing with one another on environmental issues.190 In
the 1990s, the forest industry developed the Sustainable Forestry Initiative
(SFI) as an outgrowth of the pre-existing American Forest and Paper Association.191 SFI has undergone significant changes over time. Critics have
described the initial standard as a vague code of standards. Early SFI standards did not commit to indigenous and traditional use rights, worker safety,
or to local, employment, and community involvement.192 In response to
ongoing public scrutiny of the program and a desire to compete with FSC,
SFI institutionalized its practices and structure.193 SFI began promoting
third-party audits in 1998,194 now operates under the control of a multi-stakeholder board,195 and has developed requirements pertaining to indigenous
and traditional use rights, worker safety, local employment, and community
involvement.196
III. INDUSTRIAL CULTURE UNDERLYING
NEW GOVERNANCE

THE

EMERGENCE

OF

Despite extensive scholarship on forest sustainability certifications, there
is limited analysis as to why certifications have lasted a particularly long time
within the forest industry. The void is understandable because many of the
leading researchers of forest certifications are themselves entrenched within
schools of forestry, rendering the unique characteristics of the industry
unremarkable to them.197 Legal scholars have focused on the features198 or
potential effects199 of certifications rather than on the characteristics of the
forest industry.
This Article addresses this void by examining the question: why have sustainability certifications played an ongoing role in governing the forest indus110, at 4–6 (describing the Pan European Forest Certification, SFI, and Canadian Standard
Association).
190 See Meidinger, supra note 18, at 205–06.
191 See Benjamin Cashore et al., Forest Certification (Eco-labeling) Programs and Their Policymaking Authority: Explaining Divergence Among North American and European Case Studies, 5
FOREST POL’Y AND ECON. 225, 232–33 (2003).
192 Id. at 209. In 1996, however, the American Forest and Paper Association established
a stand-alone initiative to improve workplace safety. Id. at 218.
193 Id. at 216–17.
194 Cashore et al., supra note 187, at 233.
195 Fischer et al., supra note 110, at 5.
196 Email correspondence with Kathy Abusow, President & CEO, Sustainable Forestry
Initiative Inc. March 2, 2012) (on file with author). For a discussion of institutionalization
of forest sustainability certifications, see generally Roberts, supra note 87, at n. 17.
197 See supra text accompanying note 107.
198 See generally Long, supra note 112 (discussing the role of science in various forest
auditing regimes); Meidinger, supra note 18 (providing an overview of private regulatory
efforts).
199 See generally Meidinger, supra note 18 (providing an overview of private regulatory
efforts); Meidinger, supra note 19, at 216 (“Starting with the Forest Stewardship Council
(FSC) in 1993, forest certification programs proliferated rapidly.”).
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try for over seventy years? What features of the forest industry contribute to
the ongoing certification program within it? This analysis draws upon legal,
economic, and sociological literatures to argue that the features present
within the forest industry are key to the sustained presence of private regulation within it.200
Three features are inexorably linked to the longevity of forest sustainability certifications: (1) strong, preexisting norms within the industry,
(2) an industrial model in which industry actors have superior information
relative to bureaucrats on which to formulate rules, and (3) competition
among private regulators to set and enforce meaningful rules.
A.

Norms among Industrial Foresters

Theorists have hypothesized that there is a link between strong, existing
social structures and the success of regulation—if a private regulatory regime
conforms to existing social structures, it has a greater likelihood of success.201 This section identifies and discusses the norms in the forest industry
that have played a crucial role in the longevity of sustainability certifications.
1.

Norms in Industrial Forestry

The forest industry operated under norms and private rules before the
advent of new goverance.202 Forest managers conducted themselves according to a set of norms governed by reputational bonds and social sanctions.203
Both industrial and government foresters (that is, employees of state and federal forestry agencies) operated under a shared set of norms.204 Disputes
between foresters were resolved using norm-based dispute resolution mechanisms, without reliance upon the laws governing the conflict.205 This cooperation diminished, however, when state and federal agencies evolved to
prioritize goals other than commercial timber harvest.206
Systems of norms are most robust when participants have: (1) repeated
interactions, (2) a great deal of information about each other, and (3) a
small number of group members.207 The forest industry features each of
these characteristics. Foresters comprise a small group constrained by stringent licensing requirements. They typically attend one of a handful of col200 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
201 See Bernstein & Cashore, supra note 54, at 34 (“Criteria of legitimacy . . . are thus
contingent on historical understandings . . . at play and the shared norms of the particular
community or communities granting authority . . . .”); Meidinger, supra note 18, at 129
(“[Certifications] rely heavily on preexisting social and economic networks to amplify their
credibility.”).
202 See Bradshaw, supra note 160, at 99.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 12 (1990).
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leges offering forestry degrees, work for private industry for decades prior to
obtaining managerial positions, and interact regularly both commercially
and socially.208 Further, there are a limited number of companies that conduct commercial timber operations. Large timber operators enjoy considerable economies of scale and have subsumed smaller companies as industry
profit margins lowered. Thus, the relatively high barrier to entry to becoming either a landowner or a forester historically produced a small, homogenous group of industry actors.209
Foresters working for competing firms regularly transact on issues ranging from snow removal to fire protection.210 They cooperate to finance,
build, and maintain private road systems, enforce trespassing violations,
resolve issues of timber trespass, and extinguish wildfires. Contracts are
enforced using a variety of norm-based enforcement mechanisms rather than
legalized dispute resolution techniques.211 Industry actors have a strong
sense that relationships should be governed by a spirit of cooperation and
well-established norms.212 Foresters stringently enforce best practices and
punish those who violate shared norms.213
Three specific norms within the timber industry seemingly propel high
participation rates in certification regimes; the norms of: (1) cooperation for
the sake of relationship preservation—a sense that land managers will transact in the future and thus need to preserve relationships instead of seeking
maximum individual benefit in each transaction, (2) industry protection—
acting in solidarity against perceived threats of regulation or boycott, and (3)
participation—that established land managers participate in maintaining
and promoting the forest industry through participation in licensing boards,
industry organizations, alumni organizations, agency appointments, and
conferences.
2.

Norms and the Sustainability Certifications

Pre-existing norms, rules, social sanctions, and merchant groups enabled
the forest industry to respond quickly to the creation of the NGO-created
FSC certification. Foresters used preexisting industry groups—the American
208 See Bradshaw, supra note 160, at 98.
209 Recently, however, transactions of large timberland parcels in the Northeast have
shifted from transfers between industry actors to include other buyers, including conservationists and financial companies investing in timberland, such as REITs and TIMOs. For a
discussion of changing timberland holding and transfer practices, see LLOYD C. IRLAND ET
AL., LARGE TIMBERLAND TRANSACTIONS IN THE NORTHERN FOREST 1980–2006, at 17–18 (Yale
Univ. Sch. of Forestry & Envtl. Studies, Global Inst. of Sustainable Forestry Research Paper
No. 011, 2010).
210 See Bradshaw, supra note 160, at 98–99.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 See McElfish et al., supra note 90, at 118–19 (stating that a government agent being
interviewed about complaints filed with a Tennessee agency noted that the complaints
came from members of the forest industry itself).
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Paper and Forest Products Association and its subsidiary Sustainable Forestry
Initiative (SFI)—to develop a competing private regulatory system. Incorporating certifications into existing institutions allowed an almost immediate
response—SFI was transformed into a certifying organization within one year
of the establishment of FSC.
Notably, the forest industry was already familiar with the idea underlying
sustainability certifications—many landowners were participants in the ATFS
for decades prior to the advent of FSC or SFI.214 Thus, ATFS laid the
groundwork of educating foresters about the day-to-day details of participating in a certification system. ATFS also illustrated benefits to certification
regimes beyond the illusory price premium.
This important point has received little recognition. A key incentive for
firms to participate in certification regimes is that companies participating in
its program will have access to broader markets and command a price premium for certified goods.215 But, the price premium has proven nonexistent
for forest products: empirical evidence repeatedly indicates that neither certification produces a price premium for participants.216 Further, industrial
foresters know there is not a price premium for certified timber217 and have
known that it was likely an illusion as early as the late 1960s.218
Why, then, do profit-maximizing businesses continue to participate in
costly certification schemes that do not appear to produce a positive return
on investment? The explanation appears to rest in the strength of norms to
participate in industry groups, cooperate with other landowners, and protect
the industry against threats of increased environmental regulation. Further,
industry certifications served to reinforce norms of cooperation among the
industry.219 Thus, sustainability certifications both satisfy and reinforce the
norm requiring foresters to participate in industry activities.
214 Although the ATFS certifies timberland rather than timber products, the underlying concept of sustainability certification is the same in both cases.
215 See McElfish et al., supra note 90, at 200.
216 See COMMITTEE ON CERTIFICATION, supra note 17, at 14 (noting that forest certifications do not provide a price premium); Fischer et al., supra note 110, at 1 (“[P]rice premiums have been elusive for [timber] producers.”); McElfish et al., supra note 90, at 200 &
n.576 (noting that certifications do not provide a price premium).
217 See McElfish et al., supra note 90, at 119 (noting that a forester interviewee said that
if there was a premium price for certified wood, then “everyone would want to ‘jump on
the bandwagon’”).
218 James C. McClellan, Critique of Lincoln Report: “Challenge of the Seventies,” at 4, Box 1,
TF General History 4 Folder, American Tree Farm System Records, Library and Archives,
Forest History Society, Durham, NC, USA (“Only two companies now give a bonus to tree
farmers for their wood. With the paper industry being a low profit industry the bonus idea
is probably impractical.”).
219 Don Smith, Why Be A Tree Farmer? (What the Tree Farmer Gets from the American Tree
Farm Systems), 1 Inter-Office Memorandum (August 31, 1977), Box 3, TF Historical 2
Folder, Duke Forest History Society (describing landowners who became Tree Farmers as
gaining “‘brother-in-law’ status” with others in the industry).
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Forest Users have a Comparative Advantage at Developing Rules Regulating
Forest Use Relative to Bureaucrats

Users often have superior rule-making ability relative to bureaucrats
because of their particularized knowledge of their setting and situation.220
Forest certifications, at their core, create a set of rules that companies must
follow;221 the sanction for violating rules is losing the ability to advertise a
product as certified. Unlike government regulatory regimes, industry-produced sustainability certifications are developed and enforced by resource
users. This section draws upon sociological, ecological, and economic studies of rules governing forest usage222 to argue that the nature of the forest
industry was particularly well-suited for the emergence of new governance
regulation.
Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom devoted a significant portion of her
career to studying how communities respond to rules governing the protection of forests. Relying upon a large, international database of worldwide
forestry practices, Ostrom debunked two myths about forestry practice with
direct relevance to this project. Her empirical studies of rules regulating forest use indicated that user-generated and enforced rules are superior at
preventing deforestation relative to top-down regulation developed and
enforced by outsiders.
First, Ostrom disproved that local people are unable to make rules
appropriate for governing resources.223 Ostrom’s empirical research indicated that forest usage and protection rules generated by local users produced superior protection against deforestation relative to externallydeveloped rules.224 Users make appropriate decision-makers in environmental contexts, where they may be the first to detect resource deterioration and
recovery, and thus be able to adjust the rules accordingly.225
Sustainability certificates within the forest industry benefit from the
quick transmission of information among users. Orly Lobel argues that new
220 See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 524 (1945); see
also Ostrom & Basurto, supra note 61, at 319 (explaining resource users who have some
independent decision making ability “frequently achieve better economic (as well as more
equitable) outcomes than when experts do this for them”); Mario J. Rizzo & Douglas
Glenn Whitman, The Knowledge Problem of New Paternalism, 2009 BYU L. REV. 905, 922–24
(2009) (analyzing the ability of individuals to make choices compared with policymakers’
abilities).
221 See Ostrom & Basurto, supra note 61, at 322.
222 See generally PEOPLE AND FORESTS (Clark C. Gibson et al. eds., 2000) (containing a
collection of essays with case studies of forestry practices in different areas around the
world).
223 See Tanya Hayes & Elinor Ostrom, Conserving the World’s Forests: Are Protected Areas the
Only Way?, 38 IND. L. REV. 595, 614–16 (2005).
224 Ostrom & Basurto, supra note 61, at 319.
225 See Margaret A. McKean, Common Property: What Is It, What Is It Good for, and What
Makes It Work?, in PEOPLE AND FORESTS, supra note 222, at 45 (“The resource users are the
first to detect evidence of resource deterioration and resource recovery and so need to be
able to adjust rules to ecological changes and new economic opportunities.”).

R

R

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-5\NDL515.txt

2544

unknown

Seq: 30

notre dame law review

17-JUL-13

11:01

[vol. 88:5

governance requires the “protection and encouragement of individuals
within the organization to point to problems and to engage in active dissent.”226 The flat organizational structure of the industry groups governing
the ATFS allowed ideas to be quickly transmitted, considered, and developed.
The ATFS began with a single company initiating an idea, which was transmitted from a regional industry association to a national industry association
within one year. Industry actors were continuously surveyed for ideas on how
to improve the certification through letters, surveys, and studies.
Entrusting users with rulemaking authority does not necessarily result in
overexploitation of the resource. For example, Margaret Blair identifies forest communities that systemically under-harvest their forests relative to sustainable production levels so as to provide should a higher level of resources
be needed in the future.227 Ostrom has demonstrated that “[w]hen
residents do not believe that the government has the right to regulate their
resource use, they will often find ways to resist or sabotage . . .
regulations.”228
Second, Ostrom debunked the myth that top down enforcement is
needed to protect forests.229 John Terborgh has argued that a top-down
approach must be taken to enforce resource rules because local communities
are unable to manage their resource systems alone.230 Ostrom tested this
theory by looking to several case studies. She disputed Terborgh’s analysis,
finding that enforcement was more effective when enforced by forest
users.231
Sociological literature about forests suggests that land users are uniquely
situated to adapt rules to changing economic and ecological conditions. Foresters are experienced at developing rules about their land usage to reflect
“ecological changes and new economic opportunities.”232 They do so in a
variety of formal and informal ways, including developing comprehensive
timber harvest plans that are the basis for logging operations and deciding
when in a forest life cycle to harvest and sell timber. Foresters also exhibit
broad capacity to self-enforce rules.233 They regularly oust trespassers from
land and follow fire safety practices.234 Foresters self-enforce rules or, when
norm-based enforcement fails, refer rule violations to government law
enforcement agencies.
226

Orly Lobel, New Governance as Regulatory Governance, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF GOV75 (David Levi-Faur ed. 2012).
227 McKean, supra note 225, at 45–46 (noting that Japanese villagers near Mt. Fuji prefer environmentally conservative use, but are comfortable knowingly overusing forest commons during a depression because their systemic underuse during good times allows
occasional overuse).
228 Hayes & Ostrom, supra note 223, at 600.
229 See id. at 611–14.
230 See id.
231 Id. at 613.
232 McKean, supra note 225, at 45.
233 See supra notes 213–215 and accompanying text.
234 Bradshaw, supra note 160, at 100–03.
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But, Ostrom’s study of rule generation focused on forest users, not
merely forest owners. The value of user-generated rules raises a concern
about forest sustainability certifications and new governance more broadly:
whether it is appropriately inclusive of stakeholders. At inception, the ATFS
included only government and private foresters and did not include broader
stakeholder groups. Therefore, the early iteration of this certification seemingly had fewer opportunities for stakeholder input relative to democratic,
legislative processes. Recently, forest certifications have broadened inclusion
of stakeholders—including conservation groups and indigenous peoples—
when developing rules for certification. But, questions about the relative
inclusiveness of stakeholder perspectives remains an important concern
when assessing the success of new governance regimes.
C.

Competition to Regulate

Corporate law scholars have observed that the private sector is likely to
self-regulate in the face of strong social pressure to reform its practices.235
Industry actors evaluate the success of self-regulation in relation to other private and public regulatory regimes.236 This section discusses the strong public and political pressures surrounding the forest industry, industry
perception of those pressures, and the extent to which these conditions led
to the successful development of forest sustainability certifications. It begins
by discussing the historic and current interaction between government regulatory bodies. Then it discusses competition among various certifiers in the
“market to regulate”—spheres in which private regulatory regimes compete
against government regulation and one another.
1.

Government Regulation

Forest sustainability certifications emerged both to fend off government
regulation and to regulate where government failed to do so. A central motivation for the creation of the AFTS was to forestall federal regulation of forestry practices. This threat of “drastic [f]ederal legislation” caused early
leaders of the ATFS to be careful and factually correct in their marketing
claims.237 Public critiques of the ATFS by the Chief of the Forest Service and
235 See, e.g., Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry
Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 451 (2011) (“An important external factor that
brings private companies together in search of a common organizing principle is a crisis of
public confidence in the industry. The private sector is more likely to self-regulate if there
is strong political and societal pressure for it to reform its practices . . . .”).
236 See Peter Grajzl & Andrzej Baniak, Industry Self-Regulation, Subversion of Public Institutions, and Social Control of Torts, 29 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 360, 363 (2009).
237 W.B. Greeley, Secretary-Manager of West Coast Lumbermen’s Association, Letter to
Charles R. French at American Forest Products Industries, Inc. (January 15, 1943), Box 1,
“Clements TF Correspondence 1946–66.”
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others caused industry actors to be cautious when making claims about the
success of the program.238
Prior to the advent of the ATFS, the Forest Service made many failed
attempts at national regulation of timberland cutting and management.239
The forest industry argued that states and industry actors were best positioned to create and enforce rules appropriate for local timber practices.
Decades later, FSC was created in response to continuous government inaction. Conservation groups were frustrated by the inability and unwillingness
of national governments to address deforestation, and so implemented an
extra-governmental regulatory regime.
In some ways, certification served as a middle course between top-down
and bottom-up regulation: national standards were broad and responsive to
stakeholder input and state standards focused on particular timber types.
Enforcement through local inspectors allowed flexibility for local conditions.
But, this observation raises an issue that lies at the heart of assessing the desirability of new governance strategies: the concern that new governance
approaches may displace more robust regulatory regimes that would otherwise emerge. In the forestry context, the crucial question is whether the
emergence of sustainability certifications complemented other regulatory
tools to produce environmental benefit or displaced potentially more stringent legislation.
2.

Competition Among Certifiers

Kenneth Abbot and Duncan Snidal assert that competition among regulators can exert pressure for would-be regulators to raise standards.240 This
section argues that the competitive market to regulate forest practices has
improved the standards of each certifier.
Notably, independent industry-sponsored competitors to FSC have
arisen in every country where FSC has gained traction.241 Competition
between FSC and SFI certifications is intense. Organizations supporting SFI
have brought antitrust litigation against organizations—such as the LEED
green building certification—which favor FSC products.242 Organizations
supporting FSC, in turn, seek to undermine the credibility of SFI through
direct-to-consumer public relations campaigns.243
238 There is a file folder of similar letters in the first decade of the ATFS in which
members write to organizational leaders strongly cautioning against exaggeration of the
success of the program.
239 See Hamill, supra note 158, at 459–60.
240 Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, The Governance Triangle: Regulatory Standards
Institutions and the Shadow of the Law, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION 44, 78 (Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., 2009).
241 See CASHORE ET AL., supra note 173, at 8.
242 For a discussion of this litigation, see Roberts supra note 86.
243 Alliance for Credible Forest Certification, FSC/SFI Comparisons, http://web.
archive.org/web/20120121105129/http://credibleforestcertification.org/sfi_facts/fscsfi_
comparisons. (last visited June. 11, 2013).
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The emergence and continued competitiveness of FSC has improved
forestry practices by motivating SFI to develop and change and vice versa.
Errol Medininger comments:
While SFI began in part as a rear-guard action to halt the continuing decline
in timber industry credibility while heading off more stringent regulation, it
nonetheless seems to represent a significant greening of the American forest
products industry. The SFI principles to which the industry has committed
would have been almost unthinkable even a decade ago.244

Thus, competing private regulatory systems within the forest industry have
contributed to converging, improving practices. There remains, however, the
important question of whether this improvement would have occurred if not
for the threat of government regulation and public pressure to improve environmental practices.
IV. THE ROLE

OF

INDUSTRY CULTURE

IN

NEW GOVERNANCE

New governance scholars suggest that private regulation provides a valuable complement to government regulation, but provides limited examples
of new governance regimes in practice. This Article addresses the issue headon by applying a new institutional and economics analysis to the following
questions: What industrial features give rise to new governance regimes?
What features contribute to the endurance of certifications over time? This
Section argues that the case study of forest certification tells us much about
when new governance is likely to emerge. But, forest certifications do not
offer a magic bullet of judging the success of new governance regimes—
instead, it provides a mixed account in which extra-governmental regulation
has improved over time but is impossible to compare with legislation or treaties that might have otherwise been enacted.
The “success” of sustainability regimes are at once hotly contested and
well-studied, suggesting there is no easy answer as to whether this form of
regulation should be evaluated as a success. Thus, this Article provides
insight into the likelihood of new governance regimes to emerge in industries with a pre-existing system of norms, a resource type best governed by
users, and competing private regulatory systems to spur continual improvement. Through its exploration of an early forerunner to modern new governance approaches, this Article highlights both the successes and limitations
of new governance.
A.

Corporate Social Responsibility

The corporate social responsibility literature describes sustainability certifications as if they were a self-contained unit. The case study of forestry
certification regimes pushes back against this limited frame of analysis and
encourages scholars to take a broader look at the entire environment surrounding the industry.
244

Meidinger, supra note 18, at 217.
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For example, corporate literature explains that firms are motivated to
join certification regimes because of a price premium or broadened market
access. In the case study of forest certifications, however, participants know
that there is no price premium but continue to participate in the certification. They do so citing fears of poor public perception, boycott of non-certified products, and lessened market access for non-certified goods. Each of
these “sticks” is an enforcement mechanism that is not unique to sustainability certifications, but is rather also a lever affecting other areas of firm
life.
Competition is decried as creating “green noise” that confuses consumers, with little attention paid to the benefits of competition. In the case of
forestry, initial and ongoing competition has improved each of the certification regimes operating within the United States. Further, the ongoing
“threat” of governmental regulation is also at play.
A competitive regulatory environment is an important feature of private
regulation. If a private regulator exercises a monopoly over regulation, it is
unclear whether actors will be motivated to fully integrate external stakeholder concerns and maximize enforcement. In contrast, a competitive regulatory environment in which multiple regulators compete creates better
outcomes. In other words, we cannot think of certifications as operating in a
vacuum, but must instead envision them as operating in a complex and
dynamic system of stakeholders. Further study into the market for regulation
is needed to tease out the interplay between competing regulatory regimes in
corporate social responsibility efforts.
B.

Private Regulation

Forest certifications are an example of new governance, in which private
regulatory regime operates against the backdrop of existing state and federal
laws.245 They are voluntary systems of rules developed, monitored, and
enforced by non-state actors (largely industry groups or environmental nongovernmental organizations).
Certifications have several features we can expect to find in private regulatory regimes, namely a strong similarity to government regulation operated
by non-government actors.246 Certifications show the viability of self-regulation as a complement to government regulation. When the costs of self-regulation are lower than the cost of compliance with externally imposed
regulation, self-regulation may still be positively perceived.247 The increase
in legitimacy and use of sustainability certifications support optimism about
the power of private regulations to produce socially beneficial outcomes in
some circumstances.
245
246
247

See Bernstein & Cashore, supra note 54, at 37–38.
See Meidinger, supra note 18, at 129.
See Grajzl & Baniak, supra note 236, at 363.
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New Governance

The new governance model envisions non-state actors regulating behavior against a loose backdrop of limited government involvement. The rise of
new governance is tied to the failure of government to solve emerging
problems. Similarly, forest sustainability certification regimes arose against a
backdrop of failed multilateral governance.248 Attempts to forge a binding
international convention to manage forest use failed so notably that most
states and even prominent nongovernmental organizations strongly oppose a
global forest convention.249 In this failure of state action, private regulation
of the “multilevel multiplayer” kind envisioned by new governance scholars
emerged.
The example of forest sustainability certifications represents an important incremental step in establishing the viability of the new governance
model. It is inconclusive in evaluating the full extent to which private regulatory regimes will succeed in a new governance framework. The longevity and
argued success of forest sustainability certifications provides promise for new
governance, although longevity should not be conflated with success.
Against a backdrop of weakened government involvement and enforcement,
private stakeholders created a robust umbrella of private governance that
accommodates competing regulatory systems. In the forest context, new governance approaches accommodate a variety of stakeholders. Further, new
governance systems are improving over time—producing governing
processes that are more inclusive and environmental results that are welfareenhancing. Important questions remain, however, about the relative involvement of stakeholders and stringency of standards relative to government regulation through democratic process.
D.

Implications

This Article looks at new governance from a different lens, studying not
the regulation or regulators but instead the institutional environment in
which new governance emerges. The case study provides the detailed institutional analysis currently lacking from new government literature. There are
several institutional features—such as the existence of strong norms and a
sustainability certification program that has continually operated for over seventy years—that may not be duplicable in other industries.
Further study of new governance is necessary. Analysis of the experience
of private regulation in other fields will provide crucial windows of insight
into whether the features of forestry that contributed to the success of new
governance within it are generalizable and, if so, how widely they can or
should be duplicated. This Article provides a much needed example of new
governance in action. The institutional details transform theoretical ideas
248 For a detailed overview of the failure to reach state-sponsored international agreements on forestry practices, see Radoslav S. Dimitrov, Hostage to Norms: States, Institutions
and Global Forest Politics, 5 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 1 (2005).
249 See Bernstein & Cashore, supra note 54, at 47–49.
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into examples and supportable conditions under which industrial culture
contributes to a long-standing new governance regime.
CONCLUSION
This Article begins by introducing the idea of new governance—in
which private regulatory regimes complement rules set and enforced by state
actors. It illustrated the trend of new governance flowing through corporate,
environmental, and law and economics literature. A key, unanswered question emerged: what industrial features give rise to new gomernance? To
answer the question, this Article provided a new institutional economics
account of the sustainability certifications in the forest industry. Detailed
analysis of industrial characteristics indicated three features contribute to the
longevity of private regulation in the industry: (1) strong, preexisting norms,
(2) industry actors with a competitive advantage in setting rules, and (3) a
robust market for public and private regulation. This suggests that proposals
to solve environmental problems using new governance should first analyze
whether these institutional features are present, and therefore available to
support the implementation of new governance approaches.

